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Abstract
How does risk perception affect risk regulation? Happyville is a society in
which citizens wrongly believe that the drinking water supply is contami-
nated. We discuss the condition under which a benevolent Director of Envi-
ronment Protection would invest in a water cleanup technology. This holds
if the Director is populist, namely if he maximizes social welfare based on
citizens’ pessimistic beliefs that the drinking water supply is contaminated.
However, investment in the water cleanup technology may also occur if the
Director is paternalistic, in the sense that he maximizes social welfare based
on his own beliefs while accounting for how citizens will respond to the reg-
ulation. More generally, we derive and interpret conditions such that risk
misperceptions justify systematic over-regulation of risks.
Key-words: Risk Regulation, Misperception of Probabilities, Paternal-
ism.
JEL Classification: D81, D78, H51
1 Introduction
Citizens often hold beliefs about risks that systematically differ from the ob-
served frequencies of those risks and from experts’ beliefs (Camerer, 1995,
Margolis, 1996). For instance, a study developed in the 1980s by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) showed that lay people ranked
most environmental risks differently from EPA experts (Allen, 1987).1 These
differences in risk perceptions may be related to the well-documented ten-
dency of citizens to overestimate risks with small probabilities, or risks that
have received significant media attention (Kahneman et al., 1982, Slovic,
2000).
There is also evidence of a great deal of variability in public prevention
expenditures across different risks. Specifically, most regulations issued by
the EPA in the last three decades have an implicit cost per life saved higher
than $10 million, and often a much higher figure (Viscusi, 1998). In contrast,
studies based on individuals’ willingness-to-pay usually obtain a value of a
statistical life ranging from $1 to $10 million.2 These observations suggest
that there has been a persistent over-regulation of environmental risks in the
United States.3 The example of hazardous waste sites is especially striking
1In particular, lay people ranked the highly publicized risk from hazardous waste sites
as the most serious risk, while this risk was only ranked medium or low risk by EPA
experts.
2See for instance Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Moreover, a much lower implicit cost per
life (or life-year) saved is usually found for health care, transportation or occupational
prevention programs compared to environmental protection programs (Tengs at al., 1995).
3See, e.g., Hahn (1996). It is difficult to find similar data about the efficiency of risk
policies for european countries, probably as the use of benefit-cost analysis is less developed
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in this respect, with a cost per life saved of the Superfund program estimated
to be more than $1 billion.4
Putting together these two bodies of evidence suggests that risk regula-
tors respond to citizens’ beliefs about risks. For instance, Sunstein (2000)
observes that “EPA policies track ordinary judgments extremely well”, and
that “the government currently allocates its limited resources poorly, and it
does so partly because it is responsive to ordinary judgments about the magni-
tude of risks” (Sunstein, 2000, p. 227). Regulators may respond to citizens’
beliefs by political opportunism, or simply because they have similar percep-
tion biases. Notice that regulators’ responsiveness is an expression of well-
functioning deliberative democracies, and is in a sense perfectly legitimate.
But is it economically desirable?
Whether or not regulators should respond to citizens’ beliefs raises a puz-
zling normative question. This question is well illustrated by the Happyville
fable.5 Happyville is a society in which people believe that the drinking wa-
in Europe than in the United States. Hammitt et al. (2005) suggest, however, that some
risks (including transport, energy and health risks) are more regulated in Europe than in
the United States.
4See Viscusi and Hamilton (1999); see also the Table 1 reported in Sunstein (2000),
which indicates the high implicit cost per life saved of several hazardous waste reduction
programs.
5See Portney (1992), page 131: “You are Director of Environmental Protection in
Happyville (...). The drinking water supply in Happyville is contaminated by a naturally
occurring substance that each and every resident believes may be responsible for the above-
average cancer rate observed there. So concerned are they that they insist you put in place
a very expensive treatment system to remove the contaminant. (...)
You have asked the top ten risk assessors in the world to test the contaminant for
carcinogenicity (...). These ten risk assessors tell you that while one could never prove
that the substance is harmless, they would each stake their professional reputations on its
being so. You have repeatedly and skillfully communicated this to the Happyville citizenry,
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ter is contaminated while all experts agree it is harmless. Furthermore, any
attempt to inform people that the water is safe has had no effect. People
remain anxious and they urge the Director of Environmental Protection to
invest in a water cleanup technology. What should the Director do?
Even though the Director is convinced that citizens’ beliefs are erroneous,
the decision of whether to invest in a water cleanup technology is a difficult
one. On the one hand, consumer sovereignty arguments support the Direc-
tor’s decision to purchase a cleanup technology. This would improve welfare
since worried people would feel protected.6 On the other hand, some schol-
ars have arguably criticized this populist approach to risk regulation.7 They
stress that regulatory decisions must be driven by risk-related facts, not by
citizens’ uninformed worries. There is an obvious opportunity cost here, as
the money spent to prevent a phantom risk could be used for better purposes.
Yet, this last approach is controversial as well, as it relies on a paternalistic
view of citizens’ preferences. It presumes that the regulator knows better
than the citizens do about what is good for them.
This paper introduces a framework to study the problem faced by the Di-
rector of Environmental Protection in Happyville. Importantly, this frame-
work takes into account that citizens make choices according to their beliefs
and that they will react to the safety regulation. We use this framework to
but because of a deep-seated skepticism of all government officials, they remain completely
unconvinced and truly frightened.”.
6See Sandmo (1983) and Pollack (1995, 1998).
7See Breyer (1993), Hird (1994), Sunstein (2000) and Viscusi (2000).
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compare the outcomes of the populist policy and the paternalist policy. As
we will see, both approaches may warrant more regulatory intervention when
risks are misperceived. In particular, we find that the paternalist policy may
always lead to over-regulation of risks no matter whether the citizens are
optimistic or pessimistic. Hence, an important, and maybe unexpected, pol-
icy message of the paper is that the paternalistic approach to risk regulation
may justify a systematic over-regulation of risks.
2 The Happyville Economy
We introduce a simple model of the Happyville economy, which we will gen-
eralize in the next section. The key feature of our model is that the citizens’
beliefs about the risk related to the drinking water supply may differ from
the beliefs held by the Director. We suppose for simplicity that, except from
this difference, the preferences of the citizens and that of the Director are
aligned.
Assume that there is a single citizen living in Happyville, with quasi-linear
preferences given by
U(x, a, b) = u(b)− (1− a)bx− c(a) (1)
where
b : is the citizen’s water consumption, b ≥ 0,
u(b) : is the citizen’s gross surplus, assumed increasing and concave,
a : is the Director’s cleanup effort, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1,
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c(a) : is the per capita cleanup cost function, assumed increasing and convex,
x : is the unknown dose-response carcinogenicity risk.
Hence the damage is (1−a)bx; observe that it decreases with the cleanup
effort a and increases with consumption is b. The uncertainty bears on the
value of x, and only the expected value of x matters. Denote s the expected
value of x, when computed with the citizen’s beliefs. To simplify, we call s the
citizen’s beliefs. We assume that the Director is aware of the citizen’s beliefs
s. However, we allow the Director to have different beliefs about the risk,
denoted r. A higher s corresponds to a more pessimistic (respectively less
optimistic) citizen when s > r (respectively s < r). Throughout the paper,
we will examine how the difference between r and s (or risk misperception)
affects the cleanup effort a selected by the Director.
To start with, assume that the citizen’s consumption b is exogenously
given. We first look at the cleanup effort that would be developed by a
populist Director. Define a populist Director as a regulator who maximizes
the citizen’s welfare computed with the citizen’s beliefs s. Hence the populist
chooses the cleanup effort a by maximizing the objective U(s, a, b), so that
sb = c0(a),
that is, the marginal perceived benefit is equal to the marginal cost of the
cleanup effort a. Clearly, if the citizen is pessimistic (s > r), a populist
Director will over-invest in the cleanup technology, compared to the identical
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beliefs case when s = r. Conversely, the populist Director will under-invest
in the cleanup technology if the citizen is optimistic (s < r).
What happens if the Director is paternalistic? Define a paternalist Di-
rector as a regulator who maximizes the citizen’s welfare computed with his
own beliefs r. In this case, it is easy to see that the Director’s policy a
does not depend on the citizen’s beliefs s. Indeed, the paternalist Director
simply maximizes over a the objective U(r, a, b), which yields rb = c0(a), as
if there were no beliefs distortion. To sum up, when water consumption is
given, the populist policy is determined by the citizen’s beliefs (but neglects
some valuable information) while the paternalist policy is unaffected by risk
misperceptions (but ignores the citizen’s worries).
Few situations are such that the citizen’s risk exposure is exogenously
given. The problem becomes more realistic and more interesting when con-
sumption b is not given, but may change as beliefs s and the cleanup effort
a change. When allowing for this possibility, the citizen chooses, for a given
cleanup effort a, his water consumption b(a, s) to maximize U(s, a, b), so that
u0(b(a, s)) = (1− a)s. (2)
According to the intuition, water consumption b(a, s) is decreasing in the
perceived probability of getting cancer s and increasing in the level of cleanup
effort a.
The populist criterion now corresponds to the citizen’s welfare computed
with beliefs s: U(s, a, b(a, s)). On the other hand, the paternalist criterion is
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U(r, a, b(a, s)), and we denote a(r, s) a maximizer of this expression. As be-
fore, the only difference between the two criteria is that the populist Director
uses the citizen’s beliefs s while the paternalist Director uses his own beliefs
r. Observe, however, that the fact that the citizen’s consumption b(a, s) is
endogenous introduces a new subtlety into the analysis. The paternalist Di-
rector needs to account for the citizen’s actual response, i.e., the response
based on s, not on r. Clearly, maximizing instead U(r, a, b(a, r)) would be
suboptimal for the paternalist Director, as he would not correctly anticipate
the citizen’s actual reaction. We will denote this last suboptimal regula-
tory policy a(r, r) and coin it the “rationalist” policy. Observe that a(r, r)
corresponds to the optimal level of cleanup effort without any difference in
beliefs. Hence a(r, r) will be our benchmark case in the analysis; thanks to
the envelope theorem, it is such that
rb(a, r) = c0(a). (3)
To sum up, we may consider three different types of regulation. The Director
may select:
a(r, s) : the paternalist policy
a(s, s) : the populist policy
a(r, r) : the rationalist policy.
To illustrate, consider quadratic forms
u(b) = −(1− b)2/2; c(a) = a2/2.
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Then the citizen’s choice is simply b(a, s) = 1− (1− a)s,8 so that we get
U(r, a, b(a, s)) = −((1− a)s)2/2− (1− a)r(1− (1− a)s)− a2/2. (4)
Maximizing this expression over a gives the paternalist policy
a(r, s) =
r − 2rs+ s2
1− 2rs+ s2 , (5)








Figure 1 represents the three different policies as a function of the citizen’s
beliefs s. Following Viscusi (2000), we call Blissville the mirror image of
Happyville, that is, a society where the citizen is optimistic.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Since the rationalist policy a(r, r) does not take into account the citi-
zen’s beliefs, it is a straight line on the figure. By contrast, the populist
policy ignores the objective risk r, and is monotonically increasing with s.
According to the intuition, the populist policy responds to citizens’ worries.
Finally, let us turn to the paternalist policy. From equation (5), the
decision a(r, s) is decreasing in s then increasing in s. This function has its
minimum at s = r. Thus we have a(r, s) ≥ a(r, r): the paternalist policy
is always larger than the policy undertaken under no risk misperceptions.
8For simplicity we assume away zero consumption by restricting r and s to be less than
u0(0) = 1.
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In other words, the difference in beliefs always calls for more regulatory
intervention, even under the paternalist approach, and no matter whether
the citizen is pessimistic or optimistic. We examine the robustness of this
result in the following section.
3 A General Framework
Consider the following game. A regulator decides a. An agent reacts to a by
making a decision b. These choices are performed under uncertainty on the
true state of nature x ∈ X. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences of
the agent are given by the utility function U(x, a, b). Because the regulator
is benevolent, he shares the same preferences under certainty.
We assume that x takes a finite number of values. Decisions a and b are
real numbers. U is assumed to be three times differentiable with respect to
(a, b), and strictly quasi-concave with respect to b.
Let us endow the agent with beliefs q, defined in the usual manner:










whose unique solution is now denoted by b(a, q). As we have explained above,
a populist regulator would share the same beliefs, and thus would simply
maximize this objective function with respect to a to determine the optimal
policy.
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Our focus in this section is mostly on the paternalistic case. Suppose
that the beliefs p held by the regulator differ from the beliefs q held by the
agent. Acting as a Stackelberg leader, the paternalistic regulator chooses his
decision accordingly, by maximizing over a
X
x∈X
p(x)U(x, a, b(a, q)). (6)
We now show that the paternalist decision is determined by two different
effects that go in opposite directions. Differentiating with respect to a the
objective function in (6), one get:9
X
x∈X
p(x)Ua(x, a, b(a, q))| {z } +
"X
x∈X
p(x)Ub(x, a, b(a, q))
#
ba(a, q)| {z } = 0.
Protection Effect Encouragement effect
(7)
The “protection effect” corresponds to the direct effect of the regulatory
policy, namely to the change in expected utility induced by the decision a,
keeping b constant. This is the only effect that matters when the regulator
and the agent share the same beliefs, since the second term is zero when p = q.
When beliefs are different, there is a second effect that depends on the agent’s
response to the regulatory policy. We coin this effect the “encouragement
effect,” as it captures how a change in the regulatory decision may encourage
the agent to react in a specific direction.
In most regular cases, the protection and the encouragement effects have
opposite signs. Let us illustrate this on the Happyville example. Assume that
9Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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the citizen is optimistic. Thus, from the regulator’s viewpoint the citizen
consumes too much water, and his exposure to cancer risk is too high. An
increase in the prevention effort is thus required to reduce the probability of
cancer. This is the protection effect, which is positive here. However cleaning
water encourages the citizen to consume even more water, a source of dis-
utility since the citizen consumed too much water in the first place. Hence,
the encouragement effect is negative and is thus opposed to the protection
effect.10
We now examine the effect of a change in beliefs on the regulator’s deci-
sions. To do so, we need to specify what is a change in beliefs. From now on,
we fix two beliefs p and q, and analyze the regulatory policy when both the
regulator’s and the citizen’s beliefs are allowed to vary in the interval [p, q].
Suppose that the regulator holds beliefs (1− r)p+ rq, while the agent holds
beliefs (1 − s)p + sq, where r and s belong to [0, 1]. An increase in s then
makes the beliefs more different if s > r, and closer otherwise.11 Define the
10Suppose for example that Uab is positive, so that b(a, q) is increasing with a; and that
the agent’s beliefs are such that b(a, q) > b(a, p) for any a. Since Ua is increasing with
b, the protection effect is positive. Moreover, the encouragement effect is negative as it
is the product of a negative and a positive factor: the first factor is negative from the
quasi-concavity of U in b, and the second factor is positive because b(a, q) is increasing
with a. These effects would of course change sign if b(a, q) < b(a, p) or if Uab was negative,
but they would remain of opposite signs.
11For example, suppose that initially both the regulator and the agent share the same
beliefs p, but an experiment is performed, giving additional information on the true state
of nature. Nevertheless, there is an exogenous probability that the experiment has failed,
and in that case its results are uninformative. Moreover there is no way to tell whether the
experiment has failed or not. If the regulator and the agent do not agree on the probability
of failure, their revised beliefs take these linear forms.
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paternalist regulator’s expected utility as
K(a, r, s) =
X
x∈X
[(1− r)p(x) + rq(x)]U(x, a, b(a, (1− s)p+ sq)), (8)
and denote a(r, s) a solution to the regulator’s program maxaK(a, r, s).
In what follows, we vary s in order to capture the effect of the difference
in beliefs on a(r, s). Referring to Figure 1, we say that a(r, s) is U-shaped if
it is increasing when s moves away from r, in either direction. The following
Proposition identifies the condition on the regulator’s expected utility that
ensures that a(r, s) is always U-shaped.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Kas(a, 0, s) is non-negative, for any a and any
s ∈ [0, 1]. Then for any r, s ∈ [0, 1], a(r, s) is U-shaped.
To interpret this Proposition, suppose that the regulator has some beliefs
p, and that for some beliefs q the derivative Ka(a, 0, s) increases when the
agent’s beliefs (1 − s)p + sq vary from p to q. This condition ensures that
the optimal policy a(0, s) increases with s. Then the Proposition shows that
a(r, s) must be U-shaped, as in Figure 1. In that sense, monotonicity in
one direction is enough to ensure that risk misperceptions call for increasing
a, whatever the beliefs of the regulator and that of the agent in the interval
[p, q]. Moreover, the fact that the agent is pessimistic or optimistic compared
to the regulator does not matter.
Let us apply Proposition 1 to the Happyville example, as defined in (1).
Because in this example only the expectation of x matters, we can define p
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as the beliefs that put all weight on x = 0: this corresponds to the most
optimistic belief. Define also q as the beliefs which put all weight on a high
value for x, which we normalize to 1. Hence the regulator believes there is
no risk at all when r = 0, while the consumer becomes more pessimistic as s
increases. Thanks to our definition of p, K(a, 0, s) is written
K(a, 0, s) = u(b(a, (1− s)p+ sq))− c(a). (9)
The protection effect reduces to (−c0(a)), and thus is independent of s. This
is simply because the regulator believes that there is no risk at all. The
encouragement effect is more complex, and writes
u0(b(a, (1− s)p+ sq))× ∂b
∂a
(a, (1− s)p+ sq), (10)
which is positive because consumption increases with a. Now when the in-
dex of pessimism s increases, consumption decreases, so that the first term
in (10) increases. Hence, a sufficient condition for the cleanup effort to un-
ambiguously increase is that ∂b∂a increases with pessimism s (or at least does
not decrease too rapidly with s). To sum up, suppose that the water con-
sumption of the more pessimistic agent is more sensitive to cleanup efforts,
then a(r, s) is U-shaped, that is, any risk misperception induces the regulator
to increase his cleanup effort. The comparative static analysis thus critically
depends on properties of the water demand in the society. To see that, it is
convenient to define the water demand function D(ρ) associated with u by
the well-known identity
u0(D(ρ)) = ρ, (11)
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where ρ is the shadow price of water. After straightforward computations,12
we obtain:
Corollary 1 In the Happyville economy as defined in (1) and (11), a(r, s)
is U-shaped if ρ2D0(ρ) is non-increasing with ρ.
Therefore the effect of different beliefs only depends on the properties of
u, or equivalently on the water demand function D(ρ). It is thus needed that
the derivative D0(ρ) does not increase too rapidly with ρ.13
To conclude this section, we make use of this framework to examine the
effect of the difference in beliefs on the populist’s regulatory effort, and we
relate it to the paternalistic case. The populist regulator’s expected utility
is defined as
j(a, s) ≡ K(a, s, s).
The leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 i) The populist policy a(s, s) is increasing in s if jas(a, s) is
positive, for any a and s ∈ [0, 1]. ii) The paternalist policy a(r, s) is U-shaped
if jass(a, s) is negative, for any a and r, s ∈ [0, 1].
This Proposition shows that the comparative static analysis of the differ-
ence in beliefs may be solved by only examining the properties of the value
12It is direct from (10) and (2) that the comparative statics analysis only depends on
how −u
0(b)2
u00(b) varies with b, which is equivalent to the condition exhibited in the Corollary
1.
13This is verified by any linear demand function, as in the quadratic case we considered
above, as well as by any iso-elastic demand function with elasticity less than one. Empirical
works on water demand elasticity usually postulate iso-elastic demand functions, and
indeed support a value below one (see, e.g., Nauges and Thomas, 2000).
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function j. Result i) needs no proof. It expresses that the marginal gain
of increasing a increases with s, so that the populist effort must also be in-
creasing. When applied to the Happyville example, this condition reduces to
ρD(ρ) increasing, or equivalently to an elasticity of water demand less than
one. Indeed, if more pessimism led to a strong reduction in consumption, it
would reduce, and not increase, the need for a more stringent regulation.
Result ii) derives a sufficient condition for the paternalistic regulator to
increase his effort as s moves away from r. This condition is equivalent to
that derived in Proposition 1 that ρ2D0(ρ) is decreasing. Observe that this
condition is distinct from that obtained in the populist case. It makes it
clear mathematically that ii) involves the third derivative of the objective.
This condition thus relates to the sensitivity of the demand elasticity, and
not only to the demand elasticity as for the populist case.
4 Discussion
4.1 Explaining risk regulatory outcomes
A growing literature has studied why the decisions of risk regulators may
depart from the decisions predicted by benefit-cost analysis. Risk policies
are often constrained by general principles, such as the search for equity
(Viscusi, 2000), or the desire to reduce the regulator’s discretion in order to
avoid corruption, or the temptation to choose policies that benefit a political
clientele (Cropper et al., 1992, Boyer and Laffont, 1999). Obviously, risk
regulation ultimately depends on the institutions of risk management (Beck,
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1992), and their everyday functioning. And it has been suggested that bu-
reaucratic incentives and common practices in these institutions are plagued
with conservatism and status quo bias.14
There is also substantial empirical evidence that risk regulation heavily
reflects citizens’ risk perception biases (Breyer, 1993, Viscusi, 1998, Sun-
stein, 2000). It has been repeatedly observed for instance that additional
safety measures are mandated in the aftermath of a flight crash, a terrorist
attack, bad news about health-related food quality, a chemical plant acci-
dent, and the list could go on. Some scholars have suggested that these
additional safety measures can hardly be justified using a rational basis for
risk regulation. A common explanation is that these measures are a con-
sequence of the availability heuristic that makes the risk temporarily more
salient to citizens (Kahneman et al., 1982), a perception bias which is in turn
embodied in policy-making by a populist regulator (Sunstein, 2000). Hence
the literature usually explains this regulatory outcome by populism.
Our paper proposes a formal model which relates risk perception to risk
regulation. The model encompasses the populist regulation. However, we
have identified another motive for regulation, based on paternalism. It recog-
14For instance, regulators who cause undesirable outcomes by acting usually receive
more blame than those who cause undesirable outcomes by not acting. Also, regulators
often set a uniform safety norm based on a theoretical “maximally exposed” individual.
They routinely use upper bound values of probability distributions, and apply rule-of-
thumb margins of safety. As a result, regulators decisions do not pay enough attention
to the real exposed population, to the best estimates of the risk and to local disparities
in the cost of avoided damages. For a critical discussion of these various policy practices,
see, e.g., Viscusi (1998) and Adler (2005).
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nizes that citizens may make faulty choices due to their biased beliefs, and
that a regulator may rationally anticipate these choices and may want to
curb them. Consider the fact that thousands of tourists cancel their travel
plans after a flight crash or a terrorist attack, with the associated negative
consequences for the economy. Our model suggests that a paternalistic reg-
ulator should respond to these events by increasing investments in safety
compared to the no risk misperceptions case in order to mitigate these neg-
ative consequences. Similarly, a regulator should raise standards for food
safety to prevent a drop in consumption after bad news about health-related
food quality.
These remarks suggest that it may be difficult to discriminate between
populism and paternalism. There are, however, two fundamental differences.
First, when citizens make no decisions, remember that the paternalist regula-
tion is not affected by citizens’ beliefs, unlike the populist regulation. Hence,
evidence of over- or under-regulation in this case pleads for the presence
of populism. Recognizing this, the populist regulation can perhaps better
explain extra safety norms imposed to chemical plants just after a plant
accident, a risk for which citizens can only take limited actions.
The second difference occurs in the more realistic case in which citizens
make decisions. In that case, populism usually predicts under-regulation
when citizens are optimistic, while paternalismmay still predict over-regulation
under optimism. Hence, evidence of over-regulation combined with evidence
of risk under-estimation can only be explained by paternalism in this case.
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High standards for consumer and occupational risk, as well as stringent pes-
ticide regulation, may fall into this category.
Finally, although we do not want to embrace the proposition that all risk
regulatory outcomes can be best explained by our model of either populism
or paternalism, we add that this model can also capture political economy
considerations. Indeed, the populist approach fits well the case of a regulator
facing elections in the short-term. In this case, responding to the citizens’
current demands may increase the chances that the regulator is reappointed.
In the long run, however, the public will likely observe the trends of the early
damages. Hence, a populist policy may face ex-post public contestation. As
a consequence, a long-term regulator may prefer to adapt the prevention
effort to sound information about future damages. This strategy is more
in line with the paternalist approach. These observations suggest it may
be interesting to relate risk regulatory outcomes to the length of regulators’
political mandate, which may help to distinguish our two policy benchmarks.
4.2 Some critical assumptions of the model
The main assumption of the Happyville economy is that the consumer mis-
perceives the risks he faces. Such a misperception does not necessarily imply
that the consumer has a bounded rationality. Misperceptions may simply
be the consequence of costly information acquisition by a rational consumer
(e.g., because the information is highly technical). Yet, a second important
assumption is that the consumer does not revise his beliefs, even after he
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observes the Director’s cleanup effort. He may know the Director’s beliefs
and simply disagree with him; so that the Director’s choice of a has no in-
formational content and does not lead to any revision of beliefs. Another
possibility is that the consumer does not trust the Director, as in Portney’s
fable, and attributes the choice of a to other irrelevant considerations.15 The
realism of this assumption is ultimately an empirical question. Do consumers
revise their beliefs when they observe the regulatory policy, or do they stick
to their opinion? The answer is likely to depend on the experts’ credibility,
and may vary between the fully rational Bayesian model and the no-inference
case that we have considered here (see also Spence, 1977).
A related assumption in the Happyville society is that the consumer’s
decision is based upon his own (erroneous) beliefs. Typically, from the reg-
ulator’s viewpoint, optimists are over-exposed to risks and pessimists are
under-exposed to risks. These suboptimal decisions may in turn affect, or
even trigger, the safety policy intervention. Yet an additional aspect is that
the consumer’s response to the regulatory policy also depends on consumer’s
beliefs. Though this latter effect is probably more difficult to pin down em-
pirically than the former effect, our analysis suggests that it should not be
neglected as it may affect the whole picture.16
15Moreover, recall that the paternalist policy responds in the same qualitative way to
both optimism and pessimism. So while the citizen may know from observing a that his
beliefs are mistaken, he does not know the direction of the mistake. Hence, it is difficult
for the citizen to infer something from observing the regulator’s policy.
16Few studies have analyzed the consumers’ response to a change in perceived safety, and
whether this response may be affected by their own risk perceptions. Interestingly, Viscusi
(1998) report a correlation between child-resistant packages and an increase in accidental
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Also, we have considered so far a Happyville economy with only one rep-
resentative consumer, or equivalently with a homogeneous population with
identical beliefs. This assumption is strong, as there may be both pessimistic
and optimistic consumers living in the same economy. How does heterogene-
ity in consumers’ beliefs affect the regulatory policy? Clearly, this will mat-
ter for the populist regulator, whose preferred policy depends crucially on
whether consumers are on average optimistic or pessimistic. However, it is
easy to understand that beliefs heterogeneity does not change qualitatively
the paternalist policy. We can easily see that in Figure 1. Observe that
the effect of the beliefs distortion on the paternalist policy always goes in
the same direction, and again, no matter whether people are optimistic or
pessimistic. Hence, beliefs heterogeneity would not change the comparative
statics analysis in that case, still leading to increase the prevention effort. In
contrast, notice that heterogeneity in preferences, such as heterogeneity in
the individuals’ utilities, would clearly matter for both the paternalist policy
and the populist policy.
A particular form of heterogeneity obtains when some consumers have bi-
ased beliefs while others have correct beliefs. An anti-paternalistic argument
would then be the following. Why should consumers with correct perceptions
pay for the extra prevention efforts due to other consumers’ biased beliefs?
This argument applies to the Happyville economy if the regulator cannot
poisonings, which he attributes to the unanticipated effect that consumers might have
become less safety conscious due to the existence of safety caps. This also relates to the
well-known study on car accidents and seatbelts by Peltzman (1975).
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differentiate the prevention costs across consumers. However, it can easily
be seen that in the neighborhood of the benchmark cleanup effort a(r, r), the
gain for consumers with beliefs s 6= r corresponds to a first-order effect while
the loss for consumers with beliefs s = r corresponds to a second-order effect.
As a result, the increase in the prevention effort induces relatively little harm
for consumers with correct beliefs in Happyville.17
4.3 Other regulatory instruments
Finally, we discuss the role of taxation in the Happyville economy. Clearly,
taxing consumption is useless for a populist Director. On the other hand, a
paternalist Director could set a tax so as to correct the impact of different
beliefs, the optimal tax being t∗ = (1−a)(r−s). Hence, consumption is taxed
if consumers are optimistic and subsidized if consumers are pessimistic. The
optimal tax is monotonic in the difference in beliefs (and so is not a U-shaped
function of consumers’ beliefs, as in Section 3). This monotonicity property
of the tax is emphasized in the merit goods literature (see, e.g., Sandmo,
1983, Besley, 1988).18 As a consequence, each consumer now behaves as if he
shared the same beliefs r as the regulator. This means that the prevention
effort is the same as in the benchmark effort a(r, r), so that taxation permits
an efficient outcome.
17This aspect of the policy is discussed in Camerer et al. (2003), under the name of
“asymmetric paternalism”.
18See also the analysis of the paternalistic taxation in hyperbolic discounting models
with addictive goods (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003, and Gruber and Koszegi, 2004). In
these models, the addictive good may be viewed as a demerit good, and it is optimal to
tax it.
21
However, in the more realistic case where consumers have heterogeneous
beliefs, efficiency would require the use of personalized taxes, a difficult task
in practice. It may therefore be appropriate to turn to a second-best analysis
by constraining the regulator to set a uniform tax on consumption. Then a
uniform tax could only correct the average misperceptions, and the regula-
tor would still have to deal with the remaining heterogeneity. Consequently,
if consumers did not misperceive the risk on average, then the optimal tax
would likely be close to zero,19 and thus quite useless. This reasoning shows
that adjusting cleanup efforts may be a more powerful way to regulate than
using uniform taxes (even under costless redistribution). Indeed, increasing
prevention efforts can be simultaneously effective for both optimistic and
pessimistic consumers, which could not be the case with a uniform taxation
policy. This may support the observed important public investments in pre-
vention together with the prevalent use of safety norms in the domain of risks
policies, as opposed to other modes of regulation.
Obviously, there are other instruments than taxation to consider. Typi-
cally, in a world where citizens’ perceptions are biased, information policies
provide the most natural instruments to use. Consistent with the Portney’s
fable, we assumed that information policies have already been used in Hap-
pyville, and that, for some reasons, a belief perception gap persists between
the Director and the citizens. Notice also that a powerful policy would be
19In the initial Happyville example that we considered in Section 2, the optimal uniform
tax is exactly zero.
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to try to deceive citizens. For example the Director could pretend to use a
particular cleanup effort level, but in reality choose a different one. If pre-
tending is costless, such a policy of safety illusion is efficient, at the cost of
morals.
Sunstein and Thaler (2003), in their discussion on libertarian paternalism,
stress that many policies that would be useless in a world with consistent
people may be effective in a world where citizens act inconsistently. Assume
that the regulator knows the cause(s) of the inconsistency and can influence
it, without affecting the freedom of choice. Suppose for instance that in
Happyville the Director can manipulate the "framing" of the health-related
problem and in turn change water consumption decisions. In that case, a
libertarian paternalist Director may want to use a device to restore efficiency.
Importantly, this device has the advantage of having no effect on the choices
of consistent consumers, unlike the above-discussed safety norms or taxation.
5 Conclusion
An interesting policy question is whether consumers’ beliefs about risks may
explain the observed important public prevention programs. One direct ex-
planation is that populist regulators primarily increase prevention efforts to
reduce the worries of pessimistic agents, rather than to adequately respond
to the risks in presence.20 This paper has put forward another explanation:
20To illustrate, the Superfund program in the US and GMO regulatory policy in Europe
are often presented as typical examples of populist policies.
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the mere fact that a regulator disagrees with the consumers’ risk assessments
is enough to support a more stringent prevention policy.
We have formally shown that this explanation may hold by examining
the choices of a paternalistic regulator. This regulator maximizes consumers’
welfare but computed with his own beliefs over the risk, r, and not with the
consumers’ beliefs s. We have shown then that the paternalist’s prevention
effort may increase due to the presence of two distinct effects: a protection
and an encouragement effect. The protection effect may occur when con-
sumers are optimistic (s < r) so that risk-exposure is too high in the society.
As a result, the regulator simply increases his effort to reduce the level of risk
in the society. In contrast, the encouragement effect may occur when people
are pessimistic (s > r) so that risk-exposure is too low. A more stringent
policy may be efficient in this case as well, since it reduces the perceived level
of risk by consumers, and therefore helps increase consumption.21
However, the protection and encouragement effects typically go in op-
posite direction for a given consumer’s beliefs. An important purpose of
the analysis has been to compare their relative strength. Our most striking
result is that a more stringent prevention policy may be always warranted
both in a society with optimistic consumers or in a society with pessimistic
consumers. This result holds if, as a response to an increase in safety, opti-
21To illustrate the protection effect, some examples may include home safety preven-
tion, compulsory seatbelts, tolerance standard for pollutants or food additives, namely
situations where people are prone to take too much risk. To illustrate the encouragement
effect, an example could be the European stringent beef regulation in the late 90s that
permitted to mitigate the huge decrease in beef consumption following the mad cow crisis.
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mistic consumers do not increase too much their consumption and pessimistic
consumers do sufficiently increase their consumption. Hence the critical con-
dition for the result to hold may be expressed in terms of the derivative of the
consumption’s elasticity. Consequently, a policy message of the paper is that,
assuming that this condition on the consumption’s elasticity is satisfied, one
may provide an economic rationale for over-regulation of risks when people’s
beliefs about risks are distorted, no matter the direction of distortion, and
absent any political economy considerations.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: from the linearity of K in r, we have
K(a, r, s) = K(a, s, s) + (r − s)Kr(a, ., s) (12)
where the second argument in the second term is omitted because K is linear
in r. Also the regulator and the agent agree on the choice of b when they share
the same beliefs; hence from the envelope theorem we get Ks(a, s, s) = 0.
Differentiating (12) with respect to s and a, we thus get
Kas(a, r, s) = (r − s)Kars(a, ., s). (13)
This implies that Kas(a, 0, s) = −sKars(a, ., s), and thus




The assumption in the Proposition then ensures that Kas(a, r, s) is negative
for s < r and positive for s > r. This implies that a(r, s) is U-shaped.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: there remains to show result ii). From the
definition of j we have
jas(a, s) = Kar(a, ., s) +Kas(a, s, s) = Kar(a, ., s)
becauseKas(a, s, s) = 0. We thus get jass(a, s) = Kars(a, ., s). When this lat-

















Optimal cleanup effort as a function of the citizen’s beliefs s for three
different Directors: the populist, the paternalist and the rationalist.
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